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ADAPTING ALICE

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International1 has received significant criticism.2 Though the
outcome the Court reached may be reasonable, the “framework”
that the Court uses fails to guide future inquiries of fringe patents
such as the claim in Alice. The test, originally created in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 3
essentially determines subject matter eligibility by first
determining whether a claim is not subject-matter eligible, and, if it
is not, then by determining if it actually is eligible. 4 That
description may be a slight embellishment, but nevertheless, the
guidance the test gives for future disputes is minimal.
Subject matter eligibility is broadly defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101
as “any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.” 5 The Court has created implicit exceptions, found
1

134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Valve Corp., No. SACV 13–1874–GW(FFMx), 2014
WL 4772200, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (comparing the Alice test to
Justice Stewart’s infamous phrase: “I know it when I see it”); Eclipse IP, LLC v.
McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14–742–GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014); Richard Lloyd, Alice Decision Makes Software
Innovation Landscape Bleaker, Rader Claims, IAM Blog (Sep. 01, 2014),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=32997d05-6cd8-49d9-af8d4a4888a4fcf2 (quoting former Federal Circuit chief judge Rader, referring to
Mayo and its application to Alice: “It causes me great pain to recognise the worst
case in patent law history doesn’t come out of India or Pakistan or Vietnam or
China even, it comes from the United States as recently as a few years ago.”).
3
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
4
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (“First, we
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patentineligible concepts . . . . [S]tep two of this analysis [is] a search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”).
5
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
2
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nowhere in the statute, for “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.”6 Since patent claims are composed of elements,7
some of which may fall within the implicit exceptions while others
may not, a claim that is part statutory and part non-statutory can be
difficult to characterize. These claims are a hybrid mixture of
statutory and non-statutory elements.8 Much of the recent debate
about the scope of § 101 involves these hybrid claims.9 This article
proposes a test to procedurally determine the patentability of a
hybrid claim.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the historical
development of the law handling hybrid patent claims. Part III
explains the current test as created in Mayo and Alice. Part IV
argues that the current test is ambiguous, but also flexible and
amenable to a proposed adapted test. In Part V, this article
concludes that courts could use the proposed test in determining
patentability of difficult hybrid patent claims.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Since “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect,
rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas,’”10 examples of hybrid claims that consist of both statutory
and non-statutory elements could likely be found throughout the
6

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
7
See generally MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 8.03 (3d ed.
2014).
8
See Ex parte Lyell, No. 89-0461, 1990 WL 354583, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 9,
1990) (“We however do recognize that certain types of claims which appear to
be ‘hybrid’ are permitted in U.S. patent practice.”). For a detailed discussion of
hybrid claims, see 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 5:65–85
(4th ed. 2013).
9
See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 597–99 (2010); Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of
Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014).
10
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (2012)).
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patent system’s history.11 Formal discussion on this topic began in
the early 1950s with the judiciary responding to these types of
claims by creating the “point-of-novelty” test.12 This section will
explain this test and then examine the later cases of Parker v.
Flook and Diamond v. Diehr and the conflict of law that began to
build.13
A. In re Abrams: Point of Novelty
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, issued the clearest
opinion articulating the point-of-novelty test. In re Abrams 14
involved claims “for Petroleum Prospecting Method.” 15 In this
case, the non-statutory elements of the claim were objected to as
“purely mental in character.”16 The illustrative claim four recites “a
method of prospecting for petroliferous deposits” with six steps;
the court determined the last three were “mental steps.”17 The first
three steps were determined to be statutory elements: “sinking a
number of boreholes,” “sealing off each said boreholes from the
atmosphere,” and “reducing the pressure.”18 The three mental steps
involved “measuring the rate of pressure rise,” “determining the
rate . . . at a standard reference,” and “comparing the rates . . . to
detect anomalies.”19
Abrams asserted that analyzing mental-step claims such as this
needed a logical rule to follow.20 Abrams’s brief proposed a rule,
which the court appeared to adopt implicitly, that determines
11

See MOY, supra note 8, § 5:65.
See infra Parts II.A–B.
13
See infra Parts II.C–D.
14
188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
15
Id. at 165.
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
Id. (emphasis added).
19
Id. (emphasis added).
20
Id. at 166.
12
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patentability by sorting claims into one of three categories.21 The
first category is where all method steps “are purely mental in
character,”22 which would clearly not be patentable. The second
and third are the difficult ones. The second category is where “a
method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as
so-called mental steps,” but the novelty is in the mental steps;
“then the claim is considered unpatentable for the same reason that
it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.”23 The
last category is where the novelty “resides in one or more of the
positive and physical steps,” and contains patentable subject
matter.24
Though the court did not disagree with Abrams’s proposed rule
in Abrams, it nevertheless found that the claim fell within the
second category of claims. 25 The court found steps “involving
therein such purely mental terms as ‘determining’, ‘registering’,
‘counting’, ‘observing’, ‘measuring’, ‘comparing’, ‘recording’, and
‘computing’” to be non-statutory.26 Since the first two steps were
determined to be “old for the purposes of the present application,”
the novelty was in the final three steps, which involved measuring,
determining, and comparing respectively. 27 Since the court
determined that these terms were non-statutory, the claim failed the
test.28

21

See id. The court does not expressly state its approval of the test, but the court
simply applies the test in making its determination. See id. at 167.
22
Id. at 166.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 170 (“[I]t seems to us that they are eliminated from the applicability of
appellant's proposed rule 3, and fall within No. 2.”).
26
Id. at 167.
27
Id. at 168.
28
Id.
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B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Point-of-Novelty Test
The point-of-novelty test articulated in In re Abrams was
prominent in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for about two
decades before it began to fall out of favor from the courts.29 The
strengths of the point-of-novelty test are that it is based on
articulated rules and that the required novelty had to be in “both
positive and physical steps.” 30 But the test suffers from some
significant weaknesses. First, it does not evaluate the claim as a
whole.31 Second, there is some ambiguity about how to handle a
claim when there is more than one single point of novelty.32 Third,
when “the novelty does rest in the physical steps, the invention can
properly be claimed by truncating the claim language to recite only
the physical steps.”33 Largely in response to these shortcomings,
the point-of-novelty test gradually fell out of favor.34
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Gottschalk v. Benson, one
of its first decisions to establish guidelines for patentability of
computer programs. 35 The patent at issue was a method for
“converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary
numerals.” 36 The Court found the claims far too broad to be
eligible for patent protection. 37 The Court declined to use the
29

See Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“It remains
our view that we need not be encumbered in our reasoning by the ‘Rules’ of
Abrams for the reason that they have never enjoyed the approval of this court.”);
MOY, supra note 8, § 5:66.
30
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d at 166.
31
See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (holding that the claim
should be viewed as a whole to determine patentability).
32
Clearly if there is no novelty, the claim should not be considered valid, but it
is unclear how the claim should be rejected. Alternatively, if there is more than
one point of novelty, the test does not indicate how it should be handled.
33
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03 (2014).
34
See Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889–92 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
35
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
36
Id. at 64.
37
Id. at 68.
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point-of-novelty test,38 though it could be argued that the claim
falls within the first category of In re Abrams because all the steps
are “purely mental in character.”39 The Court left open the question
of patentability of computer programs in general, but said the
debate “indicate[s] to [the Court] that considered action by the
Congress is needed.”40
C. Parker v. Flook
The Supreme Court’s next computer program case came six
years later in Parker v. Flook.41 Flook applied for a patent for a
method of updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion. 42
According to the majority opinion, “[t]he only novel feature of the
method is a mathematical formula,” which is used to calculate the
alarm limit that signals the “presence of an abnormal condition
indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger.”43
The examiner rejected Flook’s application because “a patent on
this method ‘would in practical effect be a patent on the formula or
mathematics itself.’” 44 The examiner concluded that it was not
eligible subject matter.45 On appeal, the Board of Appeals of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTAB) determined the application
failed the point-of-novelty test46 because the novelty was in the
non-statutory portion, specifically the algorithm.47 The Court of
38

See CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.03.
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A. 1951). The steps are not purely
mental in the sense that they are performed on a computer, but “[t]he
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application
except in connection with a digital computer.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
40
Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
41
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
42
See id. at 585.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 587.
45
See id.
46
See supra Part A.
47
See Flook, 437 U.S. at 587 (“[T]he ‘point of novelty in [respondent's] claimed
method’ lay in the formula or algorithm described in the claims.”).
39
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Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed, deciding that the
claim’s limitation to use only in catalytic conversion would not
allow the patent to preempt all uses of the formula.48 Parker, the
Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks filed a petition
for writ of certiorari.49 Parker expressed concern about the number
of additional applications that would be filed because of the
explosion of the software industry.50
The Supreme Court explicitly said that the case turned on
subject matter eligibility, and “[did] not involve the familiar issues
of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and
103.”51 The Court even assumed that Flook’s formula was “novel
and useful and that he discovered it.”52 Though the method was
clearly a process in the ordinary meaning of the word, the concern
was that “[t]he line between a patentable ‘process’ and an
unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”53 Flook argued that
the presence of a “post-solution activity” distinguished his case
from cases in which only the algorithm is patented.54 In particular,
the post-solution activity was the “adjustment of the alarm limit to
the figure computed according to the formula.” 55 The Court
rejected the notion that post-solution activity alone could
distinguish this case from previous decisions.56 The problem, said
the majority, was that allowing post-solution activity to establish

48

See Application of Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (“The present claims do not preempt the formula or
algorithm contained therein, because solution of the algorithm, per se, would not
infringe the claims.”).
49
Flook, 437 U.S. at 587.
50
See id. at 587–88.
51
Id. at 588.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 589.
54
Id. at 589–90.
55
Id. at 590.
56
See id.
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patentability creates an incentive to append the broadest limitation
after the formula.57
In a six-to-three decision, the majority opinion held that “it is
absolutely clear that respondent's application contains no claim of
patentable invention.” 58 The majority determined that every
element of the claim besides the formula was well-known in the
art, and therefore “the claimed method [was] nonstatutory.”59 The
opinion rejected the argument that the determination could be
made under §§ 102 and 103, stating that these were not “the kind
of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”60 Though
the Court said the conclusion was “based on reasoning derived
from opinions written before the modern business of developing
programs for computers was conceived,” 61 it appears they felt
compelled to prevent this type of claim from entering the patent
system.
The dissent acknowledged that although “it may well be that
under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on the
process claimed in this case,” the method did fit under the process
requirement of § 101.62 According to the dissent, the problem with
the majority’s formulation was that “it strikes what seems to me an
equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by
importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of
novelty and inventiveness.” 63 The dissent was referring to the

57

See id.
Id. at 594.
59
Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
60
Id. at 593.
61
Id. at 595.
62
Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63
Id.
58
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concept that determining whether the claim is novel must wait until
later consideration under § 102.64
D. Diamond v. Diehr
Less than three years after Flook, the Supreme Court addressed
subject matter eligibility again in Diamond v. Diehr.65 The Court,
in a five-to-four decision, seemingly reached the opposite outcome
as Flook.66
Diehr addressed subject matter eligibility for “a process for
curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the
use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital
computer.”67 Rather than updating an alarm limit as in Flook,68 the
formula in Diehr's method was used to calculate the appropriate
cure time for the rubber.69 Also unlike Flook, the formula was
well-known in the art. 70 The procedural posture in Diehr was

64

Jeffrey A. Simenauer, Note, Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A
Criticism of the PTO's View on Algorithms, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 902
(1986).
65
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
66
Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (“The question therefore of whether a
particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls
into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,
961 (C.C.P.A. 1979))), with Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear
that respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable invention. The
chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well
known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use
of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for automatic monitoringalarming.’”).
67
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
68
Flook, 437 U.S. at 587.
69
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
70
Id at 177 n.2. The method used the Arrhenius' equation expresses the
dependence of the rate constant of a reaction on temperature. JULIA BURDGE &
JASON OVERBY, CHEMISTRY: ATOMS FIRST 576 (2nd ed., 2011).
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almost identical to Flook. 71 The patent examiner rejected the
claims on the grounds they were drawn to nonstatutory subject
matter.72 The PTAB, relying on Flook, affirmed the examiner's
decision.73 Noting that “[n]ovelty considerations have no bearing
on whether claims define statutory subject matter under § 101,” the
CCPA reversed. 74 Diamond, the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.75
Despite the glaring similarities, the majority opinion explained
that the difference between this case and Flook was that the Court
did not view the claims “as an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the
molding of rubber products.”76 The limitations in the claim other
than the formula (e.g., “installing rubber in a press,” “closing the
mold,” and “automatically opening the press at the appropriate
time”) were significant enough to compel the majority that the
patent was for the entire process, not just the formula.77
In dissent, Justice Stevens, author of the majority opinion in
Flook,78 believed the patent was truly for an “improved method of
71

In both cases, the patent examiner rejected the application, which was
affirmed by the PTAB and later reversed by the CCPA. This was followed by a
petition for certiorari from the commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.
Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180, with Flook, 437 U.S. at 587.
72
Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1979) aff'd sub nom.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
73
Id. (“It is our view that the only difference between the conventional methods
of operating a molding press and that claimed in appellants’ application rests in
those steps of the claims which related to the calculation incident to the solution
of the mathematical problem or formula used to control the mold heater and the
automatic opening of the press.”).
74
Id. at 989.
75
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181.
76
Id. at 192.
77
See id. at 191-92.
78
Flook, 437 U.S. at 585. The four dissenters, Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Marshall,
J., Blackmun, J. were all in the majority opinion of Flook. Compare id. at 585,
598 (dissenting opinion), with Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 (dissenting opinion).

213

ADAPTING ALICE

calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during the
curing process.”79 As such, he believed that it was non-statutory
for the same reasons as Flook.80 In dissent, Stevens went even
further by proposing “an unequivocal holding that no programrelated invention is a patentable process under § 101 unless it
makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the
utilization of a computer.”81
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: MAYO AND ALICE
Though Mayo82 did not involve a computer-related invention, a
discussion of the framework used by the Court in Mayo is
necessary because this framework was explicitly adopted in
Alice.83 It appears that the Supreme Court has chosen to use the
following test in Mayo for all inventions involving “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract idea[s].”84
A. Mayo v. Prometheus
The patent at issue in Mayo claimed a process for determining
whether a given dosage level of thiopurine drugs is too low or too
high for patients with autoimmune diseases.85 The representative
patent claim consists of steps of (1) “administering” the drug, (2)
“determining” the level of the drug present in the patient’s body,
and then using the level to “indicate” if it is too low or too high.86
79

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 206–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 219.
81
Id.
82
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012).
83
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) ("In [Mayo] we
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.").
84
Compare Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 with Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
85
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
86
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court took claim 1 as representative.
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (“A method of optimizing
80
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Prometheus Laboratories was the sole and exclusive licensee of the
patent.87 Prometheus sold diagnostic tests utilizing the patented
claim to Mayo, but Mayo stopped purchasing from Prometheus
and decided to make its own tests.88
In a unanimous opinion, the Court reiterated a concern about
“upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt
the use of a natural law.”89 Rather, the Court would only uphold
those patents that have “transformed these unpatentable natural
laws into patent-eligible applications of those laws.”90 The Court
first determined that the patent describes a law of nature,
specifically the relationship between the concentration of the drug
and the likelihood that the drug administration is appropriate.91 The
Court then asked, do the “claims add enough to their statements of
the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as
patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”92
In answering the foregoing question in the negative, the Court
looked to the content outside the elements that claimed a law of
nature.93 The patent claim was separated into the “administering”
step, the “determining” step, and the “wherein” clause that tells
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6–thioguanine to a
subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b)
determining the level of 6–thioguanine in said subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6–thioguanine less than
about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the
level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered
to said subject.”).
87
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
88
Id. at 1295–96.
89
Id. at 1294 (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1296.
92
Id. at 1297.
93
See id. at 1297–1305.
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what the test “indicates.” 94 The Court gave no weight to the
physical process of administering, instead saying it “simply refers
to the relevant audience.” 95 The opinion further said that the
relevant audience was already familiar with administering the
particular drug and compared the administering step to a claim
element that limits the scope to a particular technological
environment.96
Similar to the administering step, the Court did not consider
“determining” to be anything more than a mental process.97 Again,
the Court said the step was already practiced.98 Comparing the
determining step to the post-solution activity of Parker,99 this presolution activity was not significant enough to make the concept
patentable.100 Finally, the “indicates” clause was said to merely
“tell the relevant audience about the laws.”101 It did not apply the
law of nature in a way that went beyond the law itself.
Accordingly, the Court held that the patent claims were invalid
because they “effectively claim[ed] the underlying laws of nature
themselves.”102
Following Mayo, it was unclear whether this new two-part test
applied just to claims involving “laws of nature” or to more than
that.103 In fact, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo,
94

The third step includes the two “wherein” clauses that describe the
relationship between the level obtained and what should be done. See id. at
1297–98.
95
Id. at 1297.
96
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)).
97
Id. at 1297–98.
98
Id. at 1297.
99
See supra note 50 and related text.
100
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
101
Id. at 1297 (“[R]ather like Einstein telling linear accelerator operators about
his basic law and then trusting them to use it where relevant.”).
102
Id. at 1305.
103
See Joshua A. Kresh, Patent Eligibility After Mayo: How Did We Get Here
and Where Do We Go?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 521, 521–22 (2013).
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the USPTO created a test for determining subject eligibility for
methods that use natural laws and did not consider computer
programs to be affected.104 This uncertainty remained for more
than two years until the Supreme Court again addressed software
patentability.
B. Alice v. CLS Bank
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a patent
involving computer programs to explain that the Mayo framework
should be used to determine subject matter eligibility.105 Alice was
the assignee of several patents that disclose schemes to manage
certain forms of financial risk.106 Put simply, the patents claim
104

MPEP § 2106.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012); see Bryan Wisecup, Mayo v.
Prometheus: Reorganizing the Toolbox for Patent Eligible Subject Matter and
Uses of Natural Laws, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1651, 1666 (2013).
105
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
106
Id. at 2352. The patents at issue were U. S. Patent Nos. 5,970,479 (’479
patent), 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375. The parties agreed that claim 33
of the ’479 patent was representative of the method claim.
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties,
each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an
exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for
exchange of predetermined obligations, the method
comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record
for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a
supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day
balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit
record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation,
the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's
shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only
these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow
debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit
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using a computer to track financial data of two parties to determine
if the parties would fulfill their obligations. The claims were
drafted as method, system, and computer-readable medium claims,
but Alice conceded that the “media claims rise or fall with [the]
method claims,” 107 and the Court gave no extra weight to the
system claims.108 The dispute began in 2007, when CLS Bank filed
suit against Alice seeking declaratory judgment that the claims in
four of Alice’s patents were invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed.109 Alice counterclaimed, alleging infringement.110
In 2011, shortly after the Supreme Court decided Bilski,111 the
district court granted CLS Bank’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that claims were not patentable because they were directed
to an abstract concept.112 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit
record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in
chronological order; and
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing
ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits
to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in
accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted
transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time
invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.
Id. at n.2.
107
Id. at 2360.
108
Id. (“Put another way, the system claims are no different from the method
claims in substance.”).
109
Id. at 2353.
110
Id.
111
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). In Bilski, the Court held that
applicants’ business method patent was an unpatentable abstract idea, “just like
the algorithms in Benson and Flook.” Id. at 3231.
112
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 255 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“The Court finds claims 33 and 34 of the ‘479 Patent and each claim of the
‘510 Patent, ‘720 Patent, and ‘375 Patent to be directed to an abstract idea under
the Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski Supreme Court line of precedent.
Accordingly, these claims are invalid as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.”).
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reversed, holding that it was not “manifestly evident” that Alice’s
claims were directed to an abstract idea.113 The Federal Circuit
then granted rehearing en banc, vacated the opinion, 114 and
affirmed the judgment of the district court.115 Seven of the ten
Federal Circuit judges concluded that Alice’s “method and
computer-readable medium claims are patent ineligible.”116 Five
judges concluded that the system claims are patent ineligible.117
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 118 Justice
Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court 119 and Justice
Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg
and Justice Breyer.120
Justice Thomas declared that the Mayo two-part test
distinguishes “patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patenteligible applications of those concepts.” 121 The Mayo test first
establishes whether or not the claims are directed to a patentineligible concept.122 Part two of the Mayo test requires that the

113

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 685 F.3d 1341, 1352 (2012) ("In light of the
foregoing, this court holds that when—after taking all of the claim recitations
into consideration—it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a
patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to
be inadequate under § 101.”) vacated en banc, 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
114
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 484 Fed. Appx. 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
115
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) and aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
116
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d
1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 2354.
119
Id. at 2351.
120
Id. at 2360–61.
121
Id. at 2355.
122
Id.
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claims “contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’
the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”123
Thomas applied part one of the Mayo test to Alice’s claims and
determined that they were “drawn to the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement.”124 Thomas compared the claims at issue
to the risk hedging claims in Bilski and determined that
“intermediated settlement, like hedging [in Bilski], is an ‘abstract
idea’ beyond the scope of § 101.”125 The opinion, however, does
not elaborate on a definition of abstract concept126:
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the
precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category in
this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no
meaningful distinction between the concept of risk
hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated
settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within
the realm of “abstract ideas” as we have used that
term.127
Regarding part two of the test, which requires an inventive
concept, the majority held that “the claims at issue amount to
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified,
generic computer.”128 The opinion describes previous applications
of part two of the Mayo test, in which Mayo,129 Benson,130 and
Flook 131 claims failed because they did not have an inventive
123

Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)).
124
Id. at 2355.
125
Id. at 2356.
126
Id. at 2357.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2360 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
129
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
130
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
131
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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concept. 132 The exception was the inventive application of an
abstract concept in Diehr.133 Thomas asserts that the claims that
failed part two merely say “apply it with a computer,”134 or limit
the use of an abstract idea “to a particular technological
environment.”135 He concluded that the claims at issue were no
different.136
After determining that the method claims failed the Mayo test,
the Court stated that the computer-readable medium and system
claims were also unpatentable subject matter for “substantially the
same reasons.”137 Alice conceded that its media claims rose and
fell with its method claims.138 As for the system claims, the Court
held that “none of the hardware recited by the system claims
‘offer[ed] a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the use
of the method to a particular technological environment.’” 139
Accordingly, the Court held that these claims were also patentineligible subject matter under § 101.140
In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, said that “any ‘claim that
merely describes a method of doing business’” is not a “process”

132

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357–58.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“The
temperature measurements were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly
recalculated the remaining cure time by using the mathematical equation. These
additional steps, we recently explained, ‘transformed the process into into an
inventive application of the formula.’” (internal citations omitted)).
134
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350.
135
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)).
136
Id. at 2351.
137
Id. at 2360.
138
Id.
139
Id. (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230) (alteration in original).
140
Id.
133
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under § 101.141 Accordingly, they too consider the claims at issue
patent ineligible under § 101.142
IV. HOW THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CAN ADAPT THE ALICE TEST
Though the Supreme Court left some uncertainty in how to
apply the test,143 the Court was clear when it should be followed.144
The Federal Circuit is bound by stare decisis principles145 to apply
the “framework” articulated in Mayo and Alice to cases involving
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”146 While
commentators may protest the Alice and Mayo opinions, the reality
is that courts must follow the Court’s analysis. However, because
of the ambiguity in the framework articulated by the Supreme
Court, the Federal Circuit can formulate a new test as long as it
still contains the principles laid out in Alice; the new test should be
administrable by both lower courts and the patent office.
A. Objective of the Alice Test
In the Alice and Mayo opinions, the Court repeatedly reiterated
concern about allowing patents to claim the “building blocks of
141

Id. at 2360–61 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at
3222).
142
Id.
143
See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Valve Corp., No. SACV 13-1874-GW(FFMx), 2014
WL 4772200, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (“So, the two-step test may be
more like a one step test evocative of Justice Stewart's most famous phrase. . . .
‘I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .’” (quoting
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
144
Id. (“[B]efore Alice, it was unclear to some, including the USPTO, that the
framework set forth in Mayo applied to abstract ideas as well as to the law of
nature/natural phenomena at issue in Mayo.”).
145
See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744
F.3d 1272, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Federal Circuit review, and in particular this
Court's application of stare decisis, is critical to such uniformity.”).
146
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
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human ingenuity.”147 Therefore, when evaluating claims involving
algorithms like those described previously, the Court has declared
the claims unpatentable according to § 101, 148 rather than
invalidating the claims for lack of novelty or obviousness. It may
be that the patent claims at issue in each of the cases detailed in
depth are invalid due to lack of novelty or obviousness. 149
However, the Court’s grant of the writ of certiorari in these cases
limited to the issue to the scope of patentable subject matter.150 The
question presented to the Court limits its holding151 to § 101 and
delays the question of § 102 and § 103 to remand. Though that is a
possible explanation, it seems more likely that the Court chose to
use § 101 subject matter eligibility to rein in the boundaries of the
patent system.152

147

See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2524 (1978) (“This case turns
entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which describes
the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 210–11 (1981) (“What I believe does explain today’s holding is a
misunderstanding of the applicants’ claimed invention and a failure to recognize
the critical difference between the ‘discovery’ requirement in § 101 and the
‘novelty’ requirement in § 102.”).
149
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“[I]t may later be determined that the
respondents’ process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to
satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under
§ 103.”).
150
See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (“The question presented is whether these
claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”).
151
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954) (“The Court's consideration
will be limited to the question presented by the petition for the writ of
certiorari.”).
152
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 650 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“[T]he functional case that patents promote progress generally is stronger for
subject matter that has ‘historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws’ than for methods of doing business.”) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at
184); George R. McGuire & Blaine T. Bettinger, How the Supreme Court Got It
Right in Mayo v. Prometheus, 10 NO. 1 ABA SCITECH LAW. 12, 15 (2013).
148
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The Constitution grants Congress the authority to develop
patent and copyright laws. 153 Congress has passed legislation
directing what is patentable. 154 The statute for subject matter
eligibility lists only certain categories that can be patented.155 The
remaining things and concepts in the universe that are not included
in Congress’s choice of subject matter eligibility consequently are
not eligible for patent protection.156 The categories designated by
Congress have been further limited by judicial interpretation.157
Though Congress did not make the “implicit exceptions,” 158
Congress also has not overruled the continuing precedent of the
Supreme Court.159
The goal of these exceptions to patentability is to stop those
who try to acquire exclusive rights over more than they have

153

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
154
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
155
See id. (“[A]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.”).
156
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(“To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what is
protected, but also what is free for all to use.”). See generally MOY, supra note
8, § 5:1.
157
See e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).
158
See Wesley D. Markham, How to Explain the “Implicit Exceptions” to
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 355 (2014).
159
See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.01 (“Despite the controversies at that
time [of the America Invents Act] concerning the ‘exceptions’ to Section 101 for
abstract ideas and natural phenomena as applied to subject matter such as
business methods, computer software, and isolated DNA, including human
genes, Congress chose not to address directly questions regarding patent eligible
subject matter.”).
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actually invented.160 This occurs when patents are granted for a
law of nature, for example. The Court, in multiple opinions, has
used Einstein’s discovery of E = MC2 as an example of an
unpatentable abstract idea.161 If Einstein could obtain a patent on
the formula, simply because he discovered the laws that it obeys, it
could be used to stop any innovation that harnesses those laws.162
This outcome would have a deleterious effect on innovation.163
Harmful outcomes like this are also why the Supreme Court has
articulated the implicit exceptions to § 101.164
B. How to Square Diehr with Alice
The holding in Diehr seems directly contrary to Alice,165 yet
the majority opinion in Alice took the stance that the outcome of
160

See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“If there is to be invention
from . . . a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a
new and useful end.” (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948))).
161
See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
162
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
163
See generally The Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy Executive Summary,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 861, 864 (2004) (“[I]f patent law were to allow patent
on ‘obvious’ inventions, it could thwart competition that might have developed
based on the obvious technology.”).
164
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (“[Claiming]
the building blocks of human ingenuity . . . would risk disproportionately tying
up the use of the underlying ideas, and [is] therefore ineligible for patent
protection.” (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
165
Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (“It is [‘process’]
which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be
unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform
us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the
sun that is made by man.’”(quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952)), with
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (“We hold that . . . merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”).
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Diehr is consistent. 166 A closer look at the language of Diehr
shows that it actually succeeds on the first step of the framework in
Alice because, as characterized by the majority, it is not directed to
an abstract idea.167 The Alice majority said “[f]irst, we determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to [a] patent-ineligible
concept.”168 According to the Court, the claims in Diehr are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept.169 In Diehr, the opinion
states the claims are a “process of curing synthetic rubber.”170
Curing synthetic rubber, though probably well-known in the art,171
is certainly a patent eligible concept.172 Since step one of the Alice
test is concerned with the “concept” the claim is “directed to,”173
the adjudicator need not move on to step two of the framework,
which searches for an inventive concept for the process in Diehr.
Indeed, the opinion in Diehr even says it considers the claim “to be
drawn to an industrial process.” 174 However, according to the
dissent’s formulation of the claim in Diehr, an “improved method
of calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during
the curing process,” the subject matter is likely directed to a
patent-ineligible concept, specifically calculating time. 175 The
166

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“These additional steps, we recently explained,
‘transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula.’”)
(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299).
167
See generally Robert R. Sachs, How to Correctly Apply the Alice
Examination
Guidance,
BILSKI
BLOG
(Sept.
5,
2014),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2014/09/applying-alice-guidelines.html.
168
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (emphasis added).
169
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
170
Id.
171
The majority conceded that the claims may later be found to be anticipated.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“[I]t may later be determined that the respondents'
process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the
statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.”).
172
See, e.g., Self-Curing Synthetic Rubber, U.S. Patent No. 2,776,269 (filed
Dec. 19, 1952).
173
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
174
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
175
Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Diehr claim is a prime example of the ambiguity associated with
the first inquiry of the Alice test. Additionally, once an adjudicator
determines what the claim is directed toward, the adjudicator may
ignore potential claim limitations.176
C. Why the Alice Test is Flexible
The framework handed down in Mayo and Alice leaves
significant room for interpretation.177 The ambiguity of the test’s
first step, to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
a patent-ineligible concept ,”178 creates two questions. First, what is
the claim directed to? And second, is that concept patent
ineligible? The previous discussion regarding Diehr179 illustrates
an issue with the first question: the same claim could be interpreted
in multiple ways.180 To determine the second question of this first
step, one must know which patent concepts are ineligible. The
Alice opinion itself gives some guidance on ineligible concepts,181
but declines to “delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’
category.”182
The second step of the Alice test, “a search for an inventive
concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
176

See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (describing claim construction and the use
of claim limitations).
177
See generally Eric W. Guttag, The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and
Mayo: Why We Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and
Chakrabarty,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Sept.
25,
2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/9/25/broken-patent-eligibility-test-of-aliceand-mayo/id=51370/; Kresh, supra note 103.
178
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
179
See supra Part IV.B.
180
With the result that the characterization of the claim is outcome
determinative.
181
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57 (holding computing alarm limits, and
hedging risk, intermediated settlement as abstract ideas outside the scope of 35
U.S.C. § 101).
182
Id. at 2357.

227

ADAPTING ALICE

sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept
itself”—leaves open the inquiry about what constitutes
“significantly more.”183 The guidance for step two lies in Mayo,184
Benson, 185 Flook, 186 Diehr, 187 and Alice. 188 Of these five
representative cases, only Diehr can illustrate what the Supreme
Court considers “significantly more” because Diehr was the only
case that the Court says succeeded in the second step.189 Further
confounding the problem, the claims in Diehr could be considered
outside the scope of step two of the Alice test since they are
directed to curing rubber. 190 Accordingly, the guidance to be
gained from Alice amounts to “‘apply it’ [on a computer] is not
enough” and “limiting the use . . . ‘to a particular technological
environment’” is not enough.191 What is enough? Based on the
guidance Alice provided, perhaps anything more than “apply it on
a computer” or limitation “to a particular technological
environment” would be enough.192
The ambiguity illustrated by the foregoing analysis of the Alice
framework presents an opportunity for the judiciary to adapt the
existing test for statutory subject matter based on interpretation.193
According to basic patent law principles, claim evaluation should
183

Id. at 2355 (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2011)).
184
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (treatment of autoimmune diseases).
185
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (computer implementation of
algorithm).
186
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (updating alarm limits).
187
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (curing synthetic rubber).
188
Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (intermediated settlement performed by a generic
computer).
189
See id. at 2358.
190
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. (discussion in step one defining the method as
directed to an industrial process versus calculating time for curing rubber).
191
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
192
See generally Kresh, supra note 103.
193
See infra Part IV.D.
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avoid intermixing the consideration of novelty and nonobviousness with the determination of eligible subject matter.194
The rest of this section sets forth a proposed flow of examination
that utilizes the Alice test for subject matter eligibility but is in
“conformity with the basic principles of patent law.” 195 The
proposed test postpones the novelty and obviousness inquiry until
after a determination of subject matter eligibility has been made.
D. Proposed Adaption of Alice
This author proposes a test that could be adopted by the
Federal Circuit that is compliant with Alice,196 yet administrable by
lower courts and patent examiners. In the proposed test, the first
step to determine subject matter eligibility under § 101, similar to
the Alice framework, is to identify elements in the claim that are
covered by the implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas,”197 or those that are otherwise nonstatutory under § 101.198 Note that this is not at all the same as the
claim being “directed toward” ineligible subject matter199 because
the proposed test evaluates each of the claim elements
independently to identify whether each individual element of the
claim is statutory or non-statutory. This extra step accounts for the
fact that the claim as a whole may not be “directed toward” one

194

See CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.03.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
196
See supra Part B.
197
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013)).
198
For example, a poem is non-statutory under § 101 and should instead be the
subject of copyright protection. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.01 (“The
general purpose of the statutory classes of subject matter is to limit patent
protection to the field of applied technology, what the United States Constitution
calls ‘the useful arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.)).
199
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
195
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single concept.200 Additionally, determining what an entire claim is
“directed toward” can be very subjective and ignores claim
limitations, 201 which is contrary to the principles of peripheral
claiming. The outcome of determining what a claim is “directed
toward” could determine the test’s final result. For example, in
Diehr, the majority asserted that the claim was directed toward
curing rubber,202 whereas the dissent characterized the invention as
an improved method of calculating time for the curing of rubber.203
Both sides made good arguments, but this shows how the
characterization of what a claim is “directed towards” can be
dispositive.
Under the proposed test, an adjudicator would classify
elements as either non-statutory or statutory. When an element of a
claim is classified non-statutory, the offending element, for the
purpose of subject matter eligibility under § 101, is classified
“known in the art.” The Supreme Court has long implicitly used
this step.204 Another way of saying that an element is “known in
the art” is that the element should be left within the public
domain.205 The objective of the proposed test is to avoid granting
exclusivity to an invention comprised solely of these abstract
200

See generally Mark A. Litman, Deficiencies in the Design and USPTO
Application of Mayo Collaborative Services v, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 47 (2013) (noting the difficulty in
determining when a claim is directed toward laws of nature).
201
See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (discussing the “all limitations” rule).
202
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
203
Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (“Whether the
algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention . .
. it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”); O’Reily v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 116 (1853) (“But after much consideration, it was finally
decided that this principle must be regarded as well known. . . .”).
205
See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)
(“An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in
the public domain. . . .”).
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elements. As in Alice, with enough “additional features” the
invention as a whole may be transformed into an “inventive
concept” that is eligible for patent protection.206 The test provides a
procedure to determine what precisely is required for this
transformation.
After the claim’s non-statutory elements are identified and
classified, the next step of the proposed test is to determine if there
are statutory elements to the claim that are necessary to the
invention. 207 This check is meant to prevent patentability from
“depend[ing] simply on the draftsman’s art.” 208 The necessity
determination rules out limitations that are merely “[pre- or] postsolution activity”209 or are not required for the operation of the
overall invention. An adjudicator would then deem these necessary
statutory elements to be “known in the art.” After all the claim
elements have been classified statutory or non-statutory, Mayo
describes the conclusion of the test for § 101 eligibility: “What else
is there in the claims before us?”210 If there are any remaining
statutory elements (i.e. not deemed “known in the art”), then the
claim passes the test for statutory eligibility under § 101. Indeed,
this can be a low bar for subject matter, but it is far from the end of
the test.
Although it is unclear how the Alice framework would
continue upon a finding that the claimed matter is eligible subject
matter, 211 using this test, an adjudicator must evaluate novelty
206

See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
This determination could be considered subjective depending on the
technology area. The question to answer is: Can the invention accomplish its
purpose without this element? If it cannot, the element is necessary.
208
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593).
209
Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that post-solution activity including
“adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula”
did not make the process patentable).
210
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
211
See Samantak Ghosh, Article, Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon
Doctrine: Let's Not Lose Sight of the Forest for the Trees, 94 J. PAT. &
207
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under § 102212 and non-obviousness under § 103.213 The test for
subject matter eligibility under § 101 merely disregarded the
elements that the test considers in the public domain—it does not
establish novelty of the invention. The test sets a low threshold for
subject matter eligibility,214 instead using the other sections of the
patent code to block inappropriate claims.
The elements of the claim that are squarely in the public
domain, according to the test’s § 101 determination are not
considered in further examination under §§ 102 and 103. This may
seem like a violation of the “all elements” rule, 215 but these
elements are still considered if combined with statutory elements
in a novel, non-obvious way. Without novel application or
combination, these elements should not be protected by the patent
system216 because alone they may “inhibit further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.” 217 An
adjudicator would consider, for purposes of novelty, the previously
excluded elements if those elements add to the functioning of the
invention. An example of this is the second step of the 623 patent
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 330, 356-57 (2012) (discussing the boundaries between
sections 101, 102, and 103 in determining patentability).
212
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2253 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Do the given facts show that the product
was previously ‘in public use’?”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)).
213
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2253 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Do [the facts] show that the invention was . . . ‘non-obvious’?”)
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103).
214
Any statutory provisions necessary to the invention would be sufficient for
proper subject matter eligibility.
215
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
(1997) (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention. . . .”).
216
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental processes—or
processes of human thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they
have practical application.”). But see Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
217
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301
(2012).
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in Mayo, in which a determination is made of the concentration of
6-thioguanine in the blood.218 This determination step can be used
to orchestrate further statutory steps so it contributes toward the
claim’s novelty.
The test then proceeds by determining novelty under § 102 and
non-obviousness under § 103, which require an examination of the
prior art for the statutory elements and a comparison of the
invention as a whole against the prior art. Other than this
difference, the §§ 102 and 103 inquiries proceed as they normally
would. Accordingly, a novel, non-obvious application of an
algorithm may be appropriate. But simply applying the algorithm
on a computer is not sufficient.219 The steps below sum up the test.
§ 101: Eligible Subject Matter
1.
Classify elements that are naturally
occurring, abstract, or not technology as
“known in the art.”
2.
Classify elements that are not
necessary to the invention “known in the art.”
3.
If there exist elements not “known in
the art,” continue to step 4.
§ 102: Novelty, § 103: Non-obviousness
4.
The elements classified “known in
the art” are per se anticipated, but the novelty
and obviousness inquiry can be satisfied by
novel combination or application using all the
elements.
218

See id. at 1295.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (“Stating an
abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines
those two steps, with the same deficient result.”).
219
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The proposed test is similar to what is sometimes referred to as
the “blue pencil rule,” which conceptually removes all nonstatutory elements of the claim.220 The examination would then
proceed with this purified form of the claim.221 The difference
between the proposed test and the “blue pencil rule” is that the
purposed test allows for the non-statutory elements to still be
considered, if used in a novel combination or application. In
contrast with the “blue pencil rule,” no matter how novel the
combination of non-statutory elements is, the proposed test will
never reconsider an element once it is removed. 222 Another
significant difference is that the proposed test does not give weight
to unnecessary elements in the § 101 analysis.
To illustrate how the proposed test actually works, consider the
following hybrid claim examples. The first example is a novel
application of cryptographic security in software.223 Whether or
not the algorithm truly is new, the proposed test would deem the
algorithm element to be “known in the art” because it is an abstract
concept. The computer system would not be classified “known in
the art” since the computer and networking components are
statutory and necessary to the invention. The test then continues to
220

For detailed discussion of the “blue pencil rule,” see MOY, supra note 8, §
5:67–72. See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (rejecting
petitioner’s argument that Flook requires the “mathematical algorithm [to] be
assumed to be within the ‘prior art,’” and instead saying that the “fallacy in this
argument is that we did not hold in Flook that the mathematical algorithm could
not be considered at all when making the § 101 determination”).
221
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 28–29, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414, at
*28–29 (arguing that “[b]ecause the “wherein” clauses of respondent's claims do
not recite any physical step to be performed by a doctor (or anyone else), they
add no patentable weight to the “administering” and “determining” steps”).
222
Indeed, under this analysis, the draftsman would have no reason to include
non-statutory elements because the only effect they could have is to limit the
scope of the claim in an infringement action.
223
See, e.g., System, Method, & Software for Cyber Threat Analysis, U.S.
Patent No. 8,601,587 (filed Sept. 3, 2010).
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the novelty and non-obviousness inquiries. For novelty purposes,
the application of the algorithm on the system would be considered
since it enhances the functioning of the computer. Evaluating only
the allowed elements, the software as a whole would be considered
for novelty and non-obviousness. Accordingly, if the entire
invention in cryptographic security is novel and non-obvious
against prior art, it would be patentable. The second example,
which intuitively would be expected to be unpatentable, is a song
(or book or poem) on a typical storage medium.224 The song, novel
or otherwise, is not eligible subject matter. Rather it should be
protected by copyright. An adjudicator should consider the song
“known in the art” for § 101 criteria. The storage medium is
deemed “known in the art under the test’s necessity inquiry
because the song could be stored in some other medium without
changing its function, so it fails subject matter eligibility.
V. ANALYSIS OF ADAPTED TEST
The new test should render the same outcome as the Supreme
Court’s opinions in previous cases; this will ensure that the
proposed test is effective and fits the legal landscape as it exists.225
This section evaluates how each of the previously discussed cases
would be analyzed using the proposed test.

224

See, e.g., Compact Disk Musical Jukebox with Digital Music Library Access,
U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2006/0153020 (filed Sept. 26, 2003).
225
See generally Douglas Lind, A Matter of Utility: Dworkin on Morality,
Integrity, and Making Law the Best It Can Be, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 631,
648–49 (1996) (discussing Dworkin’s theory of interpretive fit and justification).
“Any plausible working theory of legal interpretation . . . must be able to
disqualify an interpretation that fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of fit.”
Id. at 648 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986)) (internal
punctuation omitted).
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A. In re Abrams
In re Abrams involved “petroleum prospecting.”226 The CCPA
held that In re Abrams failed the point-of-novelty test because the
novelty was in the non-statutory elements of “measuring,”
“determining,” and “comparing.” 227 Under the first step of the
proposed test, these mental-step elements would be considered
“known in the art.” The remaining elements involving “sinking,”
“sealing,” and “reducing the pressure” are necessary to the
invention because the mental steps cannot be performed without
them. Because these elements of the claim are considered
statutory, an adjudicator should continue the test with the novelty
and non-obviousness inquiries. An adjudicator should continue to
deem the first three elements “known in the art” for these inquiries,
but a novel application may be possible. However, using prior art,
it is unlikely that one would consider the application of
“measuring,” “determining,” and “comparing” to the statutory
elements as novel. Using the proposed test, one would at least
consider this composition of elements obvious because at the time
of the invention it was likely known that those steps would reach
the expected outcome.
B. Parker v. Flook
Flook involved “updating alarm limits” based on the
calculation using an algorithm.228 Here, the three elements of the
claim involve “measuring,” “calculating,” and “updating.” 229
Under the proposed test, since all three elements are abstract and
therefore deemed “known in the art,” further examination is
unnecessary. The claim fails the test under § 101 because each
element of the claim is classified “known in the art.” The absence
of any statutory elements automatically dooms this patent claim.
226

In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
See id. at 169–70.
228
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
229
See id.
227
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C. Diamond v. Diehr
Using the proposed test for the § 101 analysis, the Diehr
claim’s analysis would be similar to the majority’s analysis.230 The
claim elements involving recalculating cure time would be
classified “known in the art,” but the portions of the claim
involving “curing synthetic rubber” would be statutory because
they are necessary to the invention as a whole. Since there is at
least something necessary and statutory, it is patent-eligible subject
matter. As the majority alluded to, the questions of §§ 102 and 103
patentability are “wholly apart from whether the invention falls
into a category of statutory subject matter.”231 The formula used
would be classified as “known in the art,” so the remaining
elements likely would not be novel because curing synthetic rubber
is known.232 Using § 102 or § 103, an adjudicator could easily
come to the conclusion that curing rubber was anticipated by other
inventions. Since the Supreme Court left this question open, this
analysis will not address the question either.
D. Mayo v. Prometheus
To evaluate Mayo, the first step is to determine which elements
are statutory. The Mayo claim is described in three steps:
“administering” the drug, “measuring” the concentration of the
drug in the blood stream, and “determining” what the
concentration indicates.233 The only statutory step of the process is
the “administering” step, as the other two are “mental processes,”
so they would be classified “known in the art.” Using the test, an
adjudicator should classify the “administering” step necessary to
230

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981).
Id. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
232
See id. at 191 (“In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents'
process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the
statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.”).
233
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295
(2012).
231
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the invention and not merely “[pre-]solution activity.” 234
Therefore, the claim survives the § 101 eligibility test. However,
this step is the only statutory element, and the addition of two steps
that are classified “known in the art” is not enough to create
patentability under § 102 or § 103. Note that unlike the majority
opinion, using this analysis, the “administering” step is not merely
referring to the relevant audience.235 Using the test, an adjudicator
should treat it as a legitimate step because, for eligibility purposes,
it can be assumed that it is required in order to make the
determinations of the rest of the process. The end result likely
would turn out the same because the Supreme Court is correct that
the claims at issue “effectively claim the underlying laws of nature
themselves.”236 This validates the test because it reaches the same
outcome as the Supreme Court, but the proposed test provides
more guidance and structure about how to come to that conclusion.
E. Alice v. CLS Bank
Finally, the analysis comes to the most recent case, Alice.237
Technically, the method claim in Alice does not recite a computer,
but assuming the algorithm is run on a computer as the parties
stipulated, one would consider the computer statutory using the
new proposed test. 238 The computer is necessary, again by
stipulation of the parties, so the claim is statutory subject matter.239
For the sake of § 101, the algorithm steps would be classified
“known in the art.” For the novelty inquiry, an adjudicator using
the proposed test searches for novel and nonobvious application of
known elements on a computer. However, the most likely outcome
234

Id. at 1298 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978)).
See id. at 1297.
236
The determination step merely indicates a meaning of the data and does not
command any action. Id. at 1305.
237
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
238
Id. at 2353 (noting that “the parties have stipulated that the method claims
require a computer”).
239
See id.
235
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is that with the new proposed test, one would find the use of the
algorithm on the computer obvious because there is no other
practical use of the algorithm besides “applying it on a computer.”
The preceding analysis is not a complete examination of these
claims, but rather it is intended to illustrate how the test functions.
Though the test appears to predict the same outcome as was
adjudicated, the test proceeds with a logical and replicable path. A
repeatable procedure is necessary because the examination
procedures need to be exercised by thousands of examiners at the
USPTO.240
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International241 indicates the Court’s desire to prevent patentees
from obtaining monopoly rights on abstract ideas.242 The holding
in Alice may align with the greater needs in the patent system, but
the “framework” identified in Mayo243 and reiterated in Alice244
gives little guidance for lower courts and patent examiners about
how to apply the framework factors. This article proposed a test
that harnesses the strong points of the framework in a way that
guides future examination with articulated steps.
The Federal Circuit will have to follow the framework in Alice,
and the proposed test is one way to follow it and attain a
240

See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2011) (“No matter how incoherent or tortured relevant
judicial precedent is, the USPTO must try to distill it into a set of
comprehensible guidelines for several thousand patent examiners. . . .”).
241
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
242
Id. at 2354 (“‘[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby
thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. . . .”) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
243
The Mayo opinion never actually refers to its methodology as either
“framework” or “test.” See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97.
244
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
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predictable result. The proposed test is straightforward to follow; it
checks each element to determine whether it is statutory and then
evaluates whether it is necessary to the invention. The test allows
patents for non-statutory elements only when they “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”245 Finally,
the test isolates the issues of subject matter, novelty, and
nonobviousness into three distinct questions.246

245
246

Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981).
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